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PEW RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN LAW
There is perhaps no separate subject of litigation in the United
States where the financial consideration directly involved is
smaller and the amount of bitter litigation is larger than that
relating to pews. This is due to the fact that the owners of
pews have frequently relied on their pew rights to prevent some
change in the church edifice of which their pew was a part.
A great number of pew cases have in consequence come before
the various courts. Almost every possible angle of the matter
has been investigated and adjudicated. There is hardly a con-
tention that can be raised that has not at one time or another
received judicial consideration.
It would seem on first thought that the English cases on this
subject would be of substantial assistance to the American courts
in reaching their conclusions. This, however, is an entirely
erroneous conception. "Not much light is to be got from
decisions as to the rights of pew holders in England and else-
where, where different laws, usages and systems of religious
administration have been established."' Such difference affects
the pew rights in the two countries to such an extent that cases
decided in one are of little if any help in deciding cases in the
other.
It follows that the law on this subject in the United States is
a distinctly American product. It represents the application of
the ordinary rules of the common law to a distinctly American
situation. In the investigation of this matter the English law
can be of benefit only by way of contrast. The law as slowly
worked out by the decisions of the courts is an integral and
even typical part of the exclusively American legal system, which
defines the civil status of the American churches. As such, it
will be treated in the following pages.
The word pew is said to be derived from the Dutch word
"puye" and to signify an enclosed seat in a church.2 A pew
right therefore is an exclusive right to occupy a certain part
of a meeting house, for the purpose of attending upon public wor-
ship, and for no other purpose To constitute a church in which
'Aylward v. O'Brian, i6o Mass. 118, 125, 35 N. E. 313, 22 L. . A. 206.
'Brurnfitt v. Roberts, L. R. 5 C. P. 225.
"Daniel v. Wood, 18 Mass. l02, lO4.
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the pews are rented as distinguished from a "free church" it is
not necessary that rights in all the seats be owned by individuals.
The majority of the pews may be free without changing the
character of the church to that of a free church.4 It is necessary,
however, that seats, to constitute pews, be attached to the'build-
ing in such a way as to become part of it. A loose seat or
bench belonging to an individual in which he has been permitted
to worship for many years and which on special occasions has
been removed by the trustees of the church will therefore not be
recognized as a pew in any sense."
The acquisition of pew rights in the British Isles is closely
related to and interwoven with the system of church establish-
ment which is in vogue in that country. "In England before the
Reformation, the body of the church was common to all parish-
ioners. After the Reformation a practice arose to assign par-
"ticular seats to individuals. This assignment of seats was made
by the ordinary, by a faculty which was a mere license, and was
personal to the licensee; and all disputes concerning it were
settled by the spiritual courts."6  In addition to this faculty,
pews in England may be acquired by allotment on the part of
the ministers or churchwardens and by prescription. "In the
last case the right is appurtenant to a dwelling house and in the
others it is merely personal and not transferable or descendible."
7
In any case every parishioner has a right to a seat in the church.
It is "the duty of the churchwardens to distribute them in the
most convenient way so as to give each parishioner a seat."8
Since all residents in a certain district are presumptively mem-
bers of the English church, they are thus by mere residence
entitled to pew rights in the building maintained in that district
by the established church.
It is evident that this system of parcelling out pew rights can
have no place in America where there is no established church
and where church membership with its privileges and burdens
is voluntary in every sense of the word. It follows that pew
rights are not thrust on a person by virtue of his forced mem-
bership in a church, but are a matter of contractual arrangement
between the owners of the church building and the occupants
'Torbert v. Bennett, 24 Wash. Law Rep. 149.
'Niebuler v. Piersdorf, 24 Wis. 316.
'Livingston v. Trinity Church, 45 N. J. L. 23o, 232, 28 Abb. L. J. iiI.
'Church v. Well's Executors, 24 Pa. St. 249.
'it the matter of the Brick Presbyterian Church, 3 Edw. Ch. 155, 158.
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of its seating privileges. A contract of some kind is therefore
the basis of American pew rights just like mere membership in
the established church is the basis for analogous rights in Eng-
land. Pew rights in America are therefore all "a matter of
bargain, and entirely conventional between the trustees and those
individuals who wish to become hearers or members of the
society and to have seats in the church." 9
The form which this contract usually assumes is that of a
deed or certificate issued by the owners of the building to the
applicant for pew privileges, though the same result may also
be achieved by an allotment, by vote or otherwise, of the pews
among the various subscribers to the funds of the church.10 In
granting deeds of pews it is proper to insert such conditions
against alienation as to prevent an indiscriminate sale and retain
some right to elect and determine whom the owners will asso-
ciate with and who may associate with them. Otherwise a
number of people of another denomination finding pews to be
low in price might purchase them, become a majority and turn
the proper congregation out of its own house.11 The doctrine
that conditions against alienation in a conveyance in fee simple
are void, will therefore not be applied to conveyances of pews
since such conditions are necessary to preserve the integrity of
the society.12 While a New York court has held an absence of
two years on the part of a pew owner not to be a leaving within
the meaning of a condition which provided that the pew was
to be tendered back in such a case to the society,3 the Massa-
chusetts court in a case where the owner had left four years
before but had kept up his payments for some time, has held
that he had forfeited his pew and that the society by receiving
the payment had waived its right to declare a forfeiture only
pro tanto. 4
Next in importance to the right to declare a pew forfeited on
the breach of certain conditions is the right, usually reserved
in pew deeds, to tax the same so as to raise the necessary funds
to carry on the work of the church. Where a pew owner, by
In the matter of the Brick Presbyterian Church, 3 Edw. Ch. 155, 159.
10 O'Hear v. De Goesbriand, 33 Vt. 593, So Am. Dec. 653.
tAttorney General v. Federal Street Meeting House, 69 Mass. I, 47, 48.
'French v. Old South Society in Boston, io6 Mass. 479. See Heetey
v. St. Peter's Church, 2 Edw. Ch. 6o8, 612.
"Abernethy v. Church of the Puritans, 3 Daly I, 7.
" rocker v. Old South Society, io6 Mass. 489.
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accepting the deed, has consented to such a clause, he cannot
dispute the power of the society to levy such a tax.' 5 Where
he has obligated himself to "pay the annual sum of io% on
the original appraisement of the pew and whatever else shall be
further assessed thereon" he cannot avoid an assessment of
I57. 16 Nor will such an assessment be regarded as an incum-
brance within the meaning of a deed of a one-half interest in a
pew granted by the pew holder to another. 7 He can, however,
insist that the resolution to tax be in accordance with the con-
stitution of the society;" that the tax be imposed by such
a vote as is prescribed by such constitution;19 that it be raised
for the purpose defined in the deed and for none others,22 and
that the church services as originally contemplated be con-
tinued.2 ' He may refuse payment where a tax is illegally
assessed,22 and may when such payment has been made, recover
it back.23  He does not, however, come under any personal lia-
bility for a refusal to pay a tax legally assessed. "A pew owner
is not liable in personam unless there be some special ground
from which to infer a contract or promise to pay."24 The only
remedy of the owner of the building in such case will be to
declare a forfeiture of the pew and sell it.
25
The conditions so far considered are express conditions. They
have their foundation in some clause of the instrument by which
the pew right is granted away. It must not, however, be sup-
posed that they are the only terms to be found in such instru-
ments. On the contrary, the law unless controlled by clear and
explicit clauses to the contrary will import certain implied terms
and conditions into such instruments. Certain changes in church
property are certain to occur both in the course of human events
15Mussey v. Bufinch Street Society, 55 Mass. 148; Curtis v. Quincy
First Congregational Society, io8 Mass. 147.1'Abernethy v. Puritan Society of Christians, 3 Daly i.
17Spring v. Tongue, 9 Mass. 28.
' 8Perrin v. Granger, 33 Vt. IOI.1*Perrin v. Granger, 30 Vt. 595.
"First Methodist Episcopal Society v. Brayton, 91 Mass. 248; Mayberry
v. Mead, So Me. 27, 12 Atl. 635.
" Ebaugh v. Hendel, 5 Watts, 43, 30 Am. Dec. 291.
"First Parish v. Dowe, 85 Mass. 369.
'Second Universalist Society v. Cooke, 7 R. I. 69.
"St. Paul's Church v. Ford, 34 Barb. 6.
"Manro v. St. John's Parish, 4 Cr. C. C. 116, Fed. Cas. No. 9,313;
Hebron First Presbyterian Church v. Quackenbush, IO Johns. 217.
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and through the action of the elements. The congregation may
outgrow the church edifice or may disintegrate completely. The
building may be suddenly destroyed by fire, wind or water or
may gradually succumb to the relentless wear and tear of time.
Express provisions for such a change will be found in only
very few pew deeds. Yet the corporeal property upon which the
pew rights depend has in such cases been practically destroyed.
If "the house becomes wholly ruinous, unfit for a place of wor-
ship, and cannot be repaired, so as to be useful and convenient
for that purpose, it is evident there is no beneficial interest left
in the pew holder, for which he can claim a compensation. His
right to sit in a house without doors and windows, and when
he cannot be protected from the inclemencies of the weather
must be wholly valueless. '2  So also is his right to sit in a
house in which no services are conducted because the congre-
gation has disappeared or has been forced by its own growth to
repair to more adequate quarters of no practical value. Under
such circumstances the law therefore implies a condition sub-
sequent according to which the pew holder's rights are ter-
minated without more, so far at least as the owner of the house
is concerned. Where, therefore, the edifice has so far decayed
as to become unfit for the purposes for which it was erected"
or in addition to being ruinous has been outgrown by the congre-
gation 2  and its unfitness for public services is permanent and
not merely temporary,2 9 it may be sold outright to some third
person O or may be pulled down by its owner, but not by anyone
else,' and the materials or money realized used for the con-
struction of a new building without making any compensation to
the pew holders.3 2  The same rule applies where the building
'Kellogg v. Dickenson, i8 Vt. 266, 274.
' Wentworth v. Canton First Parish, 20 Mass. 344; Kellogg v. Dicken-
son, 18 Vt. 266.
SHeeney v. St. Peter's Church, 2 Edw. Ch. 6o8.
= Gorton v. Hadsell, 63 Mass. 5o8.
Wheaton v. Gates, 18 N. Y. 395; Sohier v. Trinity Church, iog Mass.
x. In Van Honton v. First Reformed Dutch Church, 17 N. J. Eq. 126,
the pew deed provided that the pew holders should be entitled to the
proceeds of the lot in case the church was destroyed by fire. It was held
that they were entitled to nothing since the church was not destroyed but
was sold outright.
'Howe v. Stevens, 47 Vt. 262.
"Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 266.
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has been destroyed by fire,33 or on account of the disintegra-
tion of the congregation has stood vacant for a long time.
"There seems little difference in principle between the decay of
the building rendering the further holding of services impracti-
cable, and the decadence of the society, rendering payment for
conducting the services impossible of performance."
' ' 4 The
congregation may even abandon the old church entirely and
build a new one,35 or remove it to a new location 6 without lay-
ing itself open to an action for damages by the pew holders.
It may, where internal changes in the edifice become necessary,
make them,37 even as against pew holders who have taken their
pews as a compensatiori for building the edifice,38 and though
thereby certain pews are removed farther from the pulpit and
decreased in value, 0 without giving the pew holder a right to
complain.
Wiether the rights of a pew holder are real or personal prop-
erty depends upon the instrument under which he holds and the
law under which such instrument is executed. Where he holds
under a mere lease for a term of years his rights on ordinary
principles cannot be anything else but personal property.
40
Where the statutes of the state in which the contract is made
declare such interest to be personal property, as was the case
in Massachusetts in regard to Boston before 1855 and is such
in regard to the entire state since that time, the same result will
follow. 41 Even without such a statute the Pennsylvania court
while admitting that pew rights are "a sort of interest in real
estate" has classified them as personal property on the ground
that they cannot well be transferred or transmitted generally,
Witthaus v. St. Thomas Church, x46 N. Y. Supp. 279.
3 4Huntington v. Ramsden, 92 At. (N. H.) 336, 338.
*' Fassett v. Boylston First Parish, 36 Mass. 361; In re Reformed Church
of Saugerties, 16 Barb. 237.
'Fisher v. Glover, 4 N. H. i8o.
'Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435, 9 Am. Dec. 159; Voorhees v. Amsterdam
Presbyterian Church, 8 Barb. 135, 5 How. Pr. 58, affirmed 17 Barb. io3.
' White v. Trustees, 3 Lans. 477.
' Bronson v. St. Peter's Church, 7 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 361.
'°Livingston v. Trinity Church, 45 N. J. L. 230, 237, 28 Abb. L. J. iiI;
Johnson v. Corbett, ii Paige 265, 276. It has been doubted whether pew
rights can be termed tenancies. Huntington v. Ramsden, 92 At. (N. H.)
336. For an example of such a lease, see Gifford v. Syracuse First
Presbyterian Society, 56 Barb. i14-
'Aylward v. O'Brian, i6o Mass. 118, 35 N. E. 313, 22 L. R. A. 2o6.
Similar statutory provisions exist in some other states. See the statutes
of the various states.
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are scarcely divisible among heirs and can hardly be said to be
the subject of an action of partition or ejectment or of a decree
of sale by the probate court for the payment of debts.
42
It is obvious that the underlying reason for these statutes and
the decision of the Pennsylvania court is the small value of these
rights on the one hand and the greater ease with which they
can be transferred if they are classed as personal property.
Since the stringent rules which formerly hampered real estate
transfers have been generally released, it is not surprising that
the great majority of states still treat such rights as real estate,
though it is not overlooked that a pew does not "partake of all
the properties of real estate, or entitle its owner to all the rights
of a freeholder, or subject him to all the liabilities of such citi-
zen."43  It has therefore been said that the interest in a pew
created by a lease in perpetuity is an interest "in realty and the
lessees or pew owners take title to their pews as real property." 44
No convention of the parties to the pew deed can change this
result. An instrument in which the pew rights are described as
"chattels and effects" will therefore fail to convert them into
personal property.4" Pew rights have therefore been declared to
be real estate within the meaning of the New York Religious
Corporation Act,4 6 the Statute of Limitations, 47 and the Statute
of Frauds,4" and will, on the death of the owner, pass to his
heirs, 49 subject to his widow's dower rights." It follows that
"Church v. Well's Executors, 24 Pa. St. 249; Curry v. First Presby-
terian Church, 2 Pitts. 40. See also, Livingston v. Trinity Church, 45
N. J. L. 230, 237, 28 Abb. L. J. iii.
'Randolph, J., in Presbyterian Church v. Andrews, 21 N. J. L. 325, 331.
"'St. Paul's Church v. Ford, 34 Barb, 16, i8.
'Deutch v. Stone, 27 Wkly. L. Bul. (Ohio) 20.
"Vilie v. Osgood, 8 Barb. 13o; Vorhees v. Presbyterian Church of
Amsterdam, 8 Barb. 135, 5 How. Pr. 58, affirmed 17 Barb. io3; In re
Reformed Church at Saugerties, 16 Barb. 237; Montgomery v. Johnson,
9 How. Pr. 232. But see, Freligh v. Platt, 5 Cow. 494; Bronson v. St.
Peter's Church, 7 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 361.
'Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn. 279; Brattle Square Church v. Bullard, 43
Mass. 363; Aylward v. O'Brian, I6o Mass. ii8, 35 N. E. 313, 22 L. R. A.
2o6.
"Price v. Lyons, 14 Conn. 279; Vilie v. Osgood, 8 Barb. i3o; Hodges
v. Green, 28 Vt 358; Barnard v. Whipple, 29 Vt. 401, 70 Am. Dec. 422;
First Baptist Church of Ithaca v. Bigelow, 16 Wend. 28, 30.
"Bates v. Sparrell, IO Mass. 323; Johnson v. Corbett, ii Paige 265;
McNabb v. Pond, 4 Brad. Surr. 7.
' Bronson v. St. Peter's Church, 7 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 361; Howe v.
School District, 43 Vt. 282, 291.
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trespass is a proper remedy for disturbing a pew ;51 that specific
performance of a contract to convey it may be had ;52 
that an
action involving it cannot be brought in a justice court;53 that
an execution issued out of a justice court will not affect it,"
and that no act of notoriety, such as is required in regard to
personal property, is necessary in attaching it.",
But while the status of pew rights as real estate is thus gen-
erally firmly established it must not be forgotten that a pew is
"property of a peculiar nature derivative and dependant," 56 which
is separate and distinct from the fee,
57 is not subject to the same
rules and principles as the pew owner's property in his farm
would be,58 and amounts to only a limited usufructory interest
"
or an incorporeal hereditament "in the nature of an easement."
80
The pew holder has "a right issuing out of a thing corporate
or concerning or annexed to or exercisable with the same." His
estate eludes our corporal senses and like the cardinal virtues
exists but cannot be seen or handled.
61  He does not own the
material of which his pew is composed,
62 has no interest in the
space above or below it,"' and no title to the church edifice or
to the land upon which it stands.
64 He cannot put labels on
"Jackson v. Rounseville, 46 Mass. 127; Day v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435;
Union Meeting House v. Rowell, 66 Me. 400. See Presbyterian Church
V. Andrews, 21 N. J. L. 325; White v. Marshall, Harp. (S. C.) 122.
2 Freligh v. Platt, 5 Cow. 494.
'Presbyterian Church v. Andrews, 21 N. J. L. 325.
"Deutch v. Stone, 27 Wkly. Law. Bul. (Ohio) 20.
"' Perrin v. Leverett, 13 Mass. 128.
"Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting House, 3 Gray 1, 45, 47.
'City Bank v. McIntyre, 8 Rob. 467, 470; Woodworth v. Payne, 74
N. Y. 196, 30 Am. Rep. 298, affirming 5 Hun. 551; Kellogg v. Dickinson,
18 Vt. 266; In re Reformed Church of Saugerties, 16 Barb. 237.
I Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435, 438.
"Heeney v. St. Peter's Church, 2 Edw. Ch. 6o8, 612; Freligh v. Platt,
5 Cow. 494; Voorhees v. Amsterdam Presbyterian Church, 17 Barb.
103, 109.
'Presbyterian Church v. Andrews, 21 N. J. L. 325, 328. See Hartland
Union Meeting House v. Rowell, 66 Me. 40o; Solomon v. Congregation
B'nai Jeshurun, 49 How. Prac. 263.
' Marshall v. White, 16 S. C. 122.
" Cooper v. Sandy Hill First Presbyterian Church, 32 Barb. 222, 230;
Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 266; Wentworth v. Canton First Parish, 20
Mass. 344; Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435, 9 Am. Dec. 150.
'Presbyterian Church v. Andrews, 21 N. 3. L. 325, 330; Gay v. Baker,
17 Mass. 435, 9 Am. Dec. 159.
"Abernethy v. Church of the Puritans, 3 Daly 1, 7; First Baptist
Church v. Witherell, 3 Paige 296, 24 Am. Dec. 223.
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his pew,6" box it up with boards,6 6 remove it,67 change or deco-
rate it,6 or use it for purposes incompatible with its nature,6"
such as interrogating the clergyman or interrupting the serv-
ices.70 He cannot "set up a grocery, or a grog shop or apply
it even to any other useful purpose, or shut it up and pervert
the use of it to anybody. '71 He cannot prevent the leasing of
the church to a convention,7 2 prevent it from changing its preach-
ing,73 or affect its policy in the seating of the sexes.7 4 Where the
church property is held subject to a condition subsequent he
cannot even enjoin the owner from performing acts which will
make such condition effective.' His right to use the pew is so
strictly limited to the time when services are conducted that he
subjects himself to an action of trespass if he enters it at any
other time.76 His rights thus are not absolute or unlimited but
subordinate to and qualified by the superior rights of the owner
of the building,7 7 and may even be affected by by-laws passed
after he has acquired his right. 8
Whether or not a congregation can abolish pew rights alto-
gether and transform itself into a "free church" without mak-
ing compensation to the pew owners is a question which, curi-
ously enough, has not been directly decided. Considering pew
rights as resting on contract it would seem that the conclusion
must be that no such action can legally be taken. The New
Jersey court, however, has reached a different conclusion in a
case in which the right of a congregation to declare the pew of
'Howard v. Hayward, 5, Mass. 4o8.
J ackson v. Rounseville, 46 Mass. 127.
'Antrim First Presbyterian Society v. Bass, 68 N. H. 333, 337, 44
Ati. 485.
" Church v. Well's Executors, .12 Harris 249.
6"Freligh v. Platt, 5 Cow. 494; Daniel v. Wood, i8 Mass. 102, lO4.
' Wall v. Lee, 34 N. Y. 141, 149.
Curry v. First Presbyterian Church, 2 Pitts. 40, 42.
Warner v. Bowdoin Square Baptist Society, 148 Mass. 4oo, 19 N. E.
403-
Trinitarian Clurch v. Union Congregational Society, 61 N. H. 384.
T Solomon v. Congregation B'nai Jeshurun, 49 How. Pr. 263.
Erwin v. Hurd, 13 Abb. N. C. 9I.
"'Leeds First Baptist Society v. Grant, 59 Me. 245.
'Perrin v. Granger, 33 Vt 101; Kellogg v. Dickinson, i8 Vt. 266;
In re Reformed Church of Saugerties, I6 Barb. 237; Abernethy v.
Church of Puritans, 3 Daly i; Antrim First Presbyterian Society v. Bass,
68 N. H. 333, 44 AtI. 485.
'8 Curry v. First Presbyterian Congregation, 2 Pitts. 40.
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an expelled member forfeited without any clause of the pew deed
to that effect was in question. In order to justify its decision,
however, it has in this solitary instance harked back to the Eng-
lish law and based its decision on the British and not on the
American doctrine in regard to pews.
79 However much this
decision may be in accord with the English law and however
much such a result may be desired and desirable, the conclusion
that the case is out of line with the other American cases and
is not the law except possibly in New Jersey is unavoidable and
is apparent from the reasoning which the court adopts to support
its decision.
It has been seen that a pew holder's rights are qualified, sub-
sidiary and dependent. It must not, however, be supposed that
they are shadowy or insubstantial. They are on the contrary
"substantial and material rights,"80  of which he cannot be
despoiled. In some respects they are even superior to those of
the congregation. The congregation must exercise its general
ownership in subordination to them and be restricted to the gen-
eral purposes for which churches are erected.
8 ' While therefore
in a proper case a church edifice may be abandoned, removed,
sold, taken down or altered without giving the pew owner any
right to complain or any claim for damages, there is a wide differ-
ence between cases of necessity and cases where the congrega-
tion acts from motives of mere expediency or convenience. "If
for convenience or from expediency, and not from necessity,
the pew is destroyed, the owner has a right to indemnity.
Neither the corporation, nor a majority of the congregation, can,
for mere purposes of improvement or embellishment, deprive
the pew owner of his property; certainly not without compen-
sation.18 2 In a case where a congregation acts from motives of
expediency or convenience its rights over the pews are analogous
to the power of eminent domain exercised by the state over the
property of its citizens. The pew may be taken down but only
on condition that the pew holder be compensated for his loss.
83
"Though the parish have a right to take down a meeting house
which may be in good condition in order to build one in better
'Livingston v. Trinity Church, 45 N. J. L. 230, 28 Abb. L. J. iii.
'Howe v. School District, 43 Vt. 282, 291.
SKimball v. Second Parish of Rowley, 41 Mass. 247, 249.
Voorhees v. Amsterdam Presbyterian Church, 17 Barb. 1o3, io9.
'Cooper v. Sandy Hill First Presbyterian Church, 32 Barb. 222, 229,
and cases cited.
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taste or of larger dimensions, yet in such case they must make
compensation. '84  This compensation may be in the form of
money"' or in the form of a new pew. In the latter case the
new pew should correspond in location and value to the old one,8"
but need not be of the identical number8 7 unless the old pew deed
expressly so provides.
88
But the most striking illustration of the superior rights of
pew holders is afforded by cases where execution is levied against
a church building or a mortgage is sought to be foreclosed
against it. While pews granted after the execution and delivery
of a mortgage on the building are bf course subject to the
mortgage,8 9 a different rule applies where they are granted before
such time. In such case the pew holders have "an individual
interest in the meeting house"90 which is distinct from that
represented by the owners and is not embraced in the mortgage.
"Each pew holder has an undivided right in the use and enjoy-
ment of the church, and a distinct and separate right to the use
of his pew." 91  When therefore such a mortgage is foreclosed
the rights of the pew holders must be respected. The creditor
cannot convert the house into a place of traffic, as by doing so he
would trample on the rights of the pew holders. He must pre-
serve it in its present condition and can at most satisfy his debt
by taking over its rents and profits.9 2 In regard to general
creditors of the owners of the house the pew owner is in every
case entitled to a preference,9 3 while a judgment creditor, whose
judgment is subsequent to the granting of the pews, is in no
better position. Such creditor cannot levy execution against the
building,94 nor any part of it such as the pulpit since the pew
holders take with the pews that which renders them valuable.
"The sellers can have no right to take away the windows of
"4Howard v. North Bridgewater First Parish, 24 Mass. 138, 139.
Kimball v. Rowley, 41 Mass. 247.
'Mayer v. Temple Beth El, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1013, 52 St. Rep. 638.
Colby v. Northfield and Tilton Congregational Society, 63 N. H. 63.
Samuelson v. Congregation Kol Israel Aushi Poland, 65 N. Y. Supp.
192, 52 App. Div. 287, 99 St. Rep. 192.
'Severance v. Whittier, 24 Me. 120.
'Bigelow v. Middleton Congregational Society, II Vt. 283, 287. This
was said by the court in regard to an execution.
'New Orleans City Bank v. McIntyre, 8 Rob. 467, 472.
New Orleans City Bank v. McIntyre, 8 Rob. 467, 472.
Montgomery's Appeal, i Pitts. 348.
"Bigelow v. Middleton Congregational Society, ii Vt. 283.
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the meeting house, or the walls, or the pulpit or the singers loft.
The proprietors of pews are entitled to various privileges, such
as passing through the aisles, being addressed from the pulpit,
etc. There is no property in the pulpit distinct from the right
of enjoying the house for public worship."9' 5 It follows that
the rights of those in whose name a church is held are legal in
their nature while the pew holders are the equitable owners 6 and
as such entitled to enjoin an attempted conversion of a church
building into a schoolhouse.
9 7
The relation of the pew holders toward each other deserves
a passing notice. Whili several persons who are tenants in
common of a church edifice may also be the owners of the pews
of the church,9 8 and while a single pew may be owned by several
persons as tenants in common of that pew,9 9 it is well established
that the ownership by individuals of separate pews does not
make them tenants in common of the church edifice"09 so as to
enable them to join in an equitable action.' 01 The owners of
pews "hold and possess their particular seats in severalty, in
subordination to the more general right of the trustees in the
soil and freehold."' 2  Each pew owner therefore is the absolute
owner of his particular pew right and hence may freely sue the
owner of another pew in any form of action applicable to the
circumstances.1 03
In regard to the proper remedy for disturbing a pew, the
courts have declined to allow the use of such extraordinary reme-
dies as mandamus0  and injunction, 05 and have left the com-
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plainant to the ordinary remedies provided by the common law.
In considering these remedies, however, they have reasoned
differently and have in consequence arrived at different results.
Perhaps the majority of the courts have adopted the view that
trespass is the proper remedy on the ground that so long as
pews are considered in point of law as real estate there is no
reason why the form of action given by the common law to
redress a wrong done to the right of possession of real estate is
not the legal and proper remedy.10 6 Other courts, however, have
refined a little more deeply, pointing out that a pew right, though
it is real estate, has no actual substantial existence, is incapable
of manual possession and cannot be invaded by physical force
and that for this reason an action on the case is the proper
remedy. 07  These considerations make it clear that this ques-
tion is not merely close to the line that separates trespass from
case but actually occupies the zone formed by the overlapping of
these boundary lines at certain points. It has therefore been said
that "the owner of the pew may maintain case, trespass, or
ejectment, according to the circumstances, if he is improperly
disturbed in the legitimate exercise of his legal right to use his
pew.'" 08  On the whole it will be well to avoid all difficulty by
having a count both in trespass and in case where such practice
is permissible.
To sum up: While pews in both England and America are
enclosed seats attached to a church building, the right of their
holders rest on an entirely different foundation in the two coun-
tries. In England such right inheres in all the members of the
established church of the parish in which the particular church
edifice is situated while in America it rests entirely on agreement
and hence is limited to such persons as have contracted for it.
This contract usually assumes the form of a deed. Since it is
necessary to protect the church society from undesirable pew
holders, conditions in such deed against alienation and for a
forfeiture of the pew in certain contingencies will be upheld by
the courts. Since pews in many cases are the principal source
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38 Am. Dec. 616; Kellogg v. Dickinson, i8 Vt. 266; O'Hear v. De
Goesbriand, 33 Vt. 593, 8o Am. Dec. 653; Howe v. Stevens, 47 Vt. 262;
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of revenue of the church, conditions by which the right to tax
them are reserved will also be upheld, though they will be con-
strued not to impose a personal obligation. Since church build-
ings will become dilapidated or will be destroyed, sold, altered
or abandoned, a condition will be read into the deed according
to which the pew holders will be entitled to compensation in case
changes are made as a matter of convenience but will be entitled
to nothing in case they occur otherwise. Their rights in every
case, whether they be viewed as personal property as is done in
Pennsylvania and some other states which have passed statutes
on the subject, or whether they be viewed as real estate as is
generally the case, are of an incorporeal nature subordinate
to and qualified by the superior rights of the owners of the
building, and will entitle their holder to nothing more than the
right to occupy his pew during the time set aside for public
worship. While his rights are thus generally quite subordinate,
they are superior to those of subsequent mortgagees or subse-
quent judgment creditors. Such creditors must respect not only
the pews but also all the accessories which give them value, such
as the pulpit, the singers loft, the windows and the altar. They
will therefore be unable to sell the building on foreclosure but
will have to be satisfied with taking over its rents and profits.
As betveen themselves, pew owners are owners in severalty,
and in case of a disturbance may vindicate their rights by actions
of trespass or by actions on the case.
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